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Abstract
Philosophers of science have examined The Theory of Island Biogeography by Robert
MacArthur and E. O. Wilson (1967) mainly due to its important contribution to modeling
in ecology, but they have not examined it as a representative case of ecological
explanation. In this paper, I scrutinize the type of explanation used in this paradigmatic
work of ecology. I describe the philosophy of science of MacArthur and Wilson and
show that it is mechanistic. Based on this account and in light of contributions to the
mechanistic conception of explanation due to Craver (2007), and Bechtel and Richardson
(1993), I argue that MacArthur and Wilson use a mechanistic approach to explain the
species-area relationship. In light of this examination, I formulate a normative account of
mechanistic explanation in ecology. Furthermore, I argue that it offers a basis for
methodological unification of ecology and solves a dispute on the nature of ecology.
Lastly, I show that proposals for a new paradigm of biogeography appear to maintain the
norms of mechanistic explanation implicit in The Theory of Island Biogeography.
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1. Introduction

MacArthur and Wilson’s The Theory of Island Biogeography (1967), TIB hereafter, had
been viewed as a revolutionary work of ecology just a few years after its publication
(Cody & Diamond, 1975; Simberloff, 1974), and maintained this title forty years later
(Lomolino & Brown, 2009; Lomolino, Brown, & Sax, 2010; Lomolino, Riddle,
Whittaker, & Brown, 2010; May, 2010). TIB is credited with significantly contributing
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toward introducing quantitative, predictive methods to a field that was mostly descriptive
and idiographic, consisting of qualitative statements, empirical facts and data that could
not be generalized (Cody & Diamond, 1975; Lomolino & Brown, 2009; Simberloff,
1974; Whittaker, 1998). In addition, TIB influenced conservation biology to view
protected areas as “islands” and introduced new notions to theoretical ecology (Fretwell,
1975; Kolata, 1974; Lomolino & Brown, 2009; Losos & Ricklefs, 2010; Whittaker,
1998). The domain of the theory has been expanded to include other island-like
ecosystems, including lakes, mountaintops, etc., just as MacArthur and Wilson
anticipated (Lomolino, Brown, et al., 2010, p. 24; MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, pp. 3-4).
In his intellectual autobiography, Wilson characterized biogeography as being in a
state of “grand chaos” and “largely descriptive” when he and MacArthur had focused on
it in 1961 (1994, p. 244). Its research questions were mostly historical and centered on
the origin of the fauna and flora of various regions (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, p. 5).
The largely descriptive biogeography before MacArthur and Wilson identified two
relationships, yet it did not combine them into a unified conception, rather treated them
separately. First, the species-area relationship, known since Johann Reinhold Forster
described it in 1778 and well documented by several biogeographers, is the tendency of
species’ numbers to increase with island area. Second, the species-isolation relationship,
also known since its description by Forster, is the tendency of species’ numbers to
decrease with island isolation (Lomolino & Brown, 2009, p. 15; Lomolino, Riddle, et al.,
2010, p. 517). Wilson’s study of Melanesian ants identified a third characteristic of
insular biotas: species turnover, i.e., immigrations and extinctions as frequent ecological
phenomena. The innovation of MacArthur and Wilson was to propose a unifying theory
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that explains the three characteristics of insular biotas in terms of a dynamic equilibrium
between immigration and extinction (Lomolino, Brown, et al., 2010, p. 15; Lomolino,
Riddle, et al., 2010, p. 520). They substituted “one theory for many facts” (MacArthur &
Wilson, 1967, p. 5). Moreover, they showed that the mathematical expression of the
equilibrium model (see Figure 1, subsection 4.1) that is the central piece of the theory
could be used to estimate various parameters, such as the mean dispersal distance of a
taxon, the degree of saturation of an island whose fauna was displaced from equilibrium,
and the necessary time to achieve equilibrium. The graphical form of the model (see
Figure 2, subsection 4.1) allowed them to make predictions about changes in
immigration, extinction, and turnover rates with area, isolation, severity of climate on
island, and with the number of species available in the source area that they verified
against data on insular bird faunas (Lomolino & Brown, 2009, p. 377; MacArthur &
Wilson, 1963, pp. 374-378).
TIB helped create a paradigm that is still influential. Primers of biogeography and
ecology still use TIB to introduce basic notions of island biogeography (Gotelli, 2008;
Lomolino, Riddle, et al., 2010) and encyclopedias of ecology and of evolution present the
ideas of TIB under the rubric of island biogeography (Schoener, 2008; Whittaker, 2002).
Although the limitations of this paradigm have multiplied, the new proposals to develop
the theory of island biogeography build on TIB nevertheless (Lomolino, Riddle, et al.,
2010). The book by MacArthur and Wilson remains highly cited, with more than 3,800
citations just in recent years (2000-2013), from a total of more than 7500 since its
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publication.1 This place of TIB in ecology and biogeography warrants the attention of
philosophers of science.
Most philosophical analyses of TIB have examined various epistemic aspects of
the equilibrium model. In one of the earliest discussions of TIB, Haila and Järvinen
(1982) view it as a “conceptual framework for the study of insular ecosystems” that has a
heuristic role in ecological research. They see the value of the equilibrium model of
species numbers in its contribution to understanding the structure and dynamics of
populations and communities on islands, rather than in its empirical adequacy. Although
the equilibrium model is not empirically accurate, it adds to the conceptual tools of
biologists (Odenbaugh, 2011), and its applicability to various domains is an indication of
its success (Sismondo, 2000). Kingsland (1995) discusses TIB in the context of history of
ecology and conceives of the equilibrium model of species as part of a theoretical effort
to steer ecology away from the “natural history phase” and toward becoming more like
“physics” focused on repeatable patterns. Continuing this line, Sterelny and Griffiths
(1999) argue that TIB is an example of ahistorical ecology focused on identifying patterns
and excluding the “noise” of history. Ishida (2007) disputes the interpretation of Sterelny
and Griffiths. He argues that mathematical models of TIB explain patterns by identifying
underlying mechanisms and shows that TIB does not rule out natural history or historical
explanation in ecology. I am sympathetic to Ishida’s argument, but his focus on
MacArthur ignores the contribution of Wilson to TIB, and he does not offer an account of
mechanisms described by the mathematical models, nor does he outline a conception of
explanation based on descriptions of mechanisms. Schoener (1986) also suggests that the

1

Data from Web of Science database, webofknowledge.com, as of 9 August 2013.
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equilibrium model of TIB can be interpreted along mechanistic lines, but does not
develop this proposal.
Commentators of TIB have given little attention to the importance of explanation
in this theory and its relationship to the goal of transforming biogeography into a
predictive science, yet Wilson affirmed this link when he claimed: “I think biogeography
can be made into a science. There are striking regularities no one has explained. For
example, the larger the island, the more the species of birds or ants that live on it”
(Wilson, 1994, p. 248). Thus, for biogeography to become science, it must explain
regularities. MacArthur and Wilson ascribed an explanatory role to the equilibrium model
from the outset. They first formulated the model in an article published before TIB.
There, they present the model as an alternative explanation of the number of species on
islands (MacArthur & Wilson, 1963, p. 374). The fact that TIB was instrumental in
creating a paradigm, and considering it as a project focused on explaining the speciesarea relationship, recommends it especially for examining the nature of ecological
explanation.
Against this backdrop, I examine the nature of the explanatory approach that
MacArthur and Wilson use to articulate TIB and its relevance beyond their project. First,
I sketch the conception of mechanistic explanation that I assume (section 2). I consider
then MacArthur and Wilson’s claims on the nature of scientific inquiry (section 3). In
section 4, I analyze TIB using the conception of mechanistic explanation and show that
MacArthur and Wilson’s approach is mechanistic. More specifically, I examine the
reformulations of the explanandum phenomenon and the various models offered to
account for it (subsection 4.1). I consider the components of the mechanism responsible
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for various levels of species diversity on islands (subsection 4.2), the causal relations
between them (subsection 4.3), their organization (subsection 4.4), and the experimental
strategies employed for providing evidence that MacArthur and Wilson use (subsection
4.5). I end with a general statement on the norms of mechanistic explanation in ecology
(subsection 5.1); their relevance for resolving a debate on the nature of ecology
(subsection 5.2); and the use of the norms of mechanistic explanation in some recent
proposals for a new paradigm of island biogeography (subsection 5.3).
2. Mechanistic explanation
Bechtel and Richardson offer this concise characterization of mechanistic explanation:
By calling the explanations mechanistic, we are highlighting the fact that
they treat the systems as producing a certain behavior in a manner
analogous to that of machines developed through human technology. A
machine is a composite of interrelated parts, each performing its own
functions, that are combined in such a way that each contributes to
producing a behavior of the system. A mechanistic explanation identifies
these parts and their organization, showing how the behavior of the
machine is a consequence of the parts and their organization. (1993, p. 17)
The mechanistic perspective on explanation has been subsequently developed by
Glennan (1996, 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Darden (2006), Bechtel
(2006; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005) and many others. The field of mechanistic
explanation is thriving, but for my present analysis, I rely on the work of Bechtel and
Richardson, who describe mechanistic experimental strategies, and also on the recent
development of a normative account of mechanistic explanation by Craver (2007).
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According to Craver (2007, pp. 161-162), a mechanistic explanation needs to satisfy five
requirements:
1) Mechanistic explanation must account for the multiple features of the
explanandum phenomenon, i.e., including precipitating, inhibitory,
modulating, nonstandard conditions, and byproducts.
2) Mechanistic explanations are constitutive in the sense that they explain the
mechanism as a whole in terms of the activities of its parts, which should
exhibit clusters of properties and could be used for purposes of intervention.
3) Causation in mechanisms consists of activities of component parts.
4) Mechanisms are actively, spatially, and temporally organized.
5) Mechanistic explanation offers an account of constitutive relevance.
Formulation of mechanistic explanations proceeds through a series of models that
vary from how-possibly models, which are “loosely constrained conjectures about the sort
of mechanism that might suffice to produce the explanandum phenomenon”, to howactually models that describe real components, activities, and organizational
characteristics of the mechanism that produces the phenomenon. Depending on how
complete the models of mechanisms are, they can vary along the continuum mechanism
sketch—an incomplete model of a mechanism; mechanism schemata—partial
descriptions of mechanism; and complete descriptions of mechanisms (Craver, 2007, pp.
112-114). The regulative ideal of mechanistic explanation is that “constitutive
explanations must describe all and only the component entities, activities, properties, and
organizational features that are relevant to the multifaceted phenomenon to be explained”
(Craver, 2007, p. 111).
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In section 4, I show how the theory of biogeography of MacArthur and Wilson
employs this mechanistic approach to explanation. In the next section, I look at
MacArthur and Wilson’s philosophy of science.

3. MacArthur and Wilson’s philosophy of science

Commentators of TIB typically refer to MacArthur’s writing to understand the
philosophy of science underlying this major work of ecology. Wilson’s contribution has
not received the same attention, although his work contains important statements on the
issue. I examine first the view of MacArthur and then I turn to that of Wilson, insisting in
both cases on their commitment to a mechanistic approach to doing science.

3.1. MacArthur’s philosophy of science

One of the ideas that characterizes MacArthur’s view on the nature of scientific
inquiry, in contrast to his predecessors in biogeography, is that “[t]o do science is to
search for repeated patterns, not simply to accumulate facts”, and ecology should
formulate general principles that apply across species (MacArthur, 1972, p. 1) and that
unify thus a variety of phenomena. MacArthur complements the distinction between the
search for repeated patterns and accumulation of facts from nature’s complexity with a
distinction between two explanatory approaches. One could investigate the history of a
phenomenon, or describe “the machinery of the phenomenon”, or its mechanism, as one
would call it today. The ecologist and the physicist tend to be machinery oriented, but the
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paleontologist and most biogeographers tend to be history oriented. The historian often
pays attention to differences between phenomena, since this may shed light on history.
By contrast, the “machinery person” is more focused on similarities among phenomena,
because these reveal regularities (MacArthur, 1972, p. 239). Since investigating “the
machinery of the phenomenon” reveals what produced it, to explain regularity, one needs
to describe the mechanism that brings it about. That description of ecological
mechanisms is explanatory is MacArthur’s second idea on the nature of ecological
inquiry. Consequently, he urged biogeographers to be more machinery oriented.
Here are a few examples that illustrate the importance of the notion of machinery,
aka mechanism in MacArthur’s work. Competition and predation are common and
regular processes that are also produced by machinery. This is evidenced by the title The
Machinery of Competition and Predation of the second chapter of his 1972 book.
MacArthur explains that it is difficult to define competition because “the machinery is
not obvious”, but some ecologists list “various competitive mechanisms”. He prefers a
broad definition of competition such that “[a]ny machinery that can have that effect will
be called competition. For instance, species A and B can fight, or A can reduce B’s food
supply, or A can, by its own losses, increase B’s predators” (MacArthur, 1972, p. 21). In
Geographical Ecology (1972), he examines several cases that “reveal interesting things
about the mechanisms involved” (p. 78) and mentions that there is a populationregulating mechanism that prevents a population from consuming entirely its food supply
(p. 119). Additionally, MacArthur offers examples of mechanistic explanation of various
phenomena. For example, he uses the work of C. Smith that explains the distribution of
two squirrel species by referring to their anatomy, food preferences and availability in
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geographic areas, as well as other properties (MacArthur, 1972, pp. 140-141). MacArthur
explains the low diversity of tree species in Europe compared to that in North America by
referring to the advancing glaciers that are “the actual machinery” that pushed species to
the south. The north-south orientation of mountains in America allowed trees to retreat to
the south, while the west-east orientation of the Alps and of the Mediterranean did not
allow trees to escape the pressure of glaciers. This arrangement of the mountains and of
the sea is an historical accident requiring an historical explanation, while the
advancement of the glaciers is the mechanism common to both cases (MacArthur, 1972,
p. 174).
The third idea of MacArthur’s view on ecology is that ecologists must use the
hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method. He argued that the method of fitting statistical
curves of vague biological meaning to the data should be replaced with the more fruitful
approach of predicting curves based on simple biological hypotheses and to compare
them with the data (MacArthur, 1957, p. 293).

3.2. Wilson’s philosophy of science

Looking back forty years after its publication, Wilson recalls the founding
questions that he and MacArthur asked (2009, p. 5):
How could our seemingly old-fashioned subjects (i.e., ecology and
evolutionary biology – V.P.) achieve new intellectual rigor and originality
compared to molecular biology? What can we learn from molecular
biology on how to advance our own science? We agreed that the basic
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problem was that ecology and evolutionary biology were mostly unrooted.
They needed foundations from which explanations can be developed
bottom-up. Theory has to work from lower to higher levels of biological
organization. Either alone will not do. Population biology was the
discipline we thought could serve as base to reinvigorate the theory of
ecology and evolutionary biology. (Such was the line of reasoning by
which I later produced the first syntheses of sociobiology, in The Insect
Societies, in 1971, and Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, in 1975.)
Wilson’s recollection indicates two foundational ideas of his philosophy of
science: reductionism and the hypothetico-deductive method, which I examine
successively. The early advances and success of molecular biology had lead Wilson to
claim: “I believed deeply in the power of reductionism” (Wilson, 1994, p. 255). Yet he
did not mean philosophical reductionism, as he called the intertheoretic reductionism
illustrated by Nagel’s classical account. According to Nagel, a less inclusive theory is
absorbed into, or deduced from a more comprehensive theory plus theorems derivable
from it, experimental laws, observation statements and some laws borrowed from other
special disciplines when instruments are involved (Nagel, 1961, p. 349). Following
Popper (1974), Wilson thought that philosophical reductionism is wrong. The upper-level
of organization contains principles that are “new and unexpected” and so cannot be
derived from the principles of the lower-level science. The laws of the lower-level
science “are necessary to the discipline above, they challenge and force a mentally more
efficient restructuring; but they are not sufficient for its purposes” (Wilson, 1977, pp.
137-138). Instead of conceiving of reduction as deduction of one theory from another,
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Wilson thought “[r]eduction is a method by which new mechanisms and relational
processes are discovered” (1978, p. 13). He also characterized reductionism as naturalism
and that in his sociobiological research meant bringing biology into the social sciences
(Wilson, 1994, p. 225), but without claiming that biology can explain away the social
sciences.
Wilson’s sociobiological research further shows that his belief was not in the
power of intertheoretic reductionism, but it was about methodological and explanatory
reductionism. In The Insect Societies, Wilson claims that partial explanations of social
phenomena consist of descriptions of proximate causes in physiology and behavior,
combined with the theory of ultimate causes due to colony-level selection. A more nearly
complete explanation requires in addition the population ecology of colonies (Wilson,
1971, p. 426). Yet not even the partial explanation fits the classical reductive account.
Descriptions of physiological and behavioral causes and the theory of group selection do
not form a more inclusive theory, but separate epistemic approaches. Adding population
ecology to formulate a nearly complete explanation does not make for intertheoretic
reduction, since the same problem of separate epistemic approaches persists. Even if
evolutionary biology were the reducing science, the descriptions of physiological and
behavioral causes are not borrowed laws from other sciences. Furthermore, intertheoretic
reductionism requires reducing theories to describe phenomena at a different level than
those studied by the reduced theory. However, population parameters that would be part
of the reducing theory are situated on the same stratum that contains the very social
phenomena whose theory is supposed to be reduced.
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Wilson explains that some sociobiological research involves phenomenological
and fundamental theories. Phenomenological theory consists of equations that predict
various parameters of social organization, while the fundamental theory derives the
equations from principles of genetics and ecology (Wilson, 1978, p. 28). Despite the
relationship between the two types of theories being formulated in terms of derivation,
this is not evidence of intertheoretic reductionism. Genetics and ecology are different
disciplines that characterize entities at different levels, but intertheoretic reductionism
requires the reducing theory to refer to entities at the same level.
Wilson’s claims about reductionism could be understood as a commitment to
methodological and explanatory reductionism in a weaker sense. Higher-level
phenomena ought to be explained in terms of mechanisms and processes at various lower
levels, but not at some fundamental level. Sociobiological research by Wilson shows that
explanation is a multilevel approach, integrating findings from genetics, ecology, studies
of the environment, animal behavior and physiology, and evolution. This is also the path
that Wilson followed in conceiving of evolutionary biology (Wilson, 1994, p. 226).
Wilson’s research in sociobiology also indicates that unification is a virtue that he
expected good theories to have. Outlining how sociobiology should develop, he explains
that a unified science of sociobiology should produce quantitative theory and parameters
that apply to both termite colonies and troops of rhesus macaques (1971, p. 458). It is an
expectation that resonates well with MacArthur’s thought that the general principles of
science should unify phenomena; they should apply to both Paramecium and birds (1972,
p. 1).
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MacArthur is credited with impressing the hypothetico-deductive method on
ecologists, yet Wilson’s work contains explicit formulations of the method that,
according to his recollection, underlies TIB. In both of his aforementioned books on
sociobiology, Wilson describes the hypothetico-deductive method that he uses.2 Here is a
statement from the Sociobiology: “Above all, good theory is testable. Its results can be
translated into hypotheses subject to falsifications by appropriate experiments and field
studies” (Wilson, 2000 [1975], p. 27). TIB affirms this commitment to the hypotheticodeductive method when it claims: “A theory attempts to identify the factors that
determine a class of phenomena and to state the permissible relationships among the
factors as a set of verifiable propositions” (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, p. 5).
The foregoing analysis shows that Macarthur and Wilson had similar views on the
nature of scientific inquiry, with the concept of mechanism playing a central role.
Explanation of biogeographic phenomena consists in description of mechanisms
producing those phenomena. Descriptions of mechanisms also underlie hypotheses that
are used to make predictions tested against empirical data. Hypotheses that are not
rejected support our confidence in the purported mechanism. When the same mechanism
produces multiple instances, their “unity lies in the pervasiveness of the underlying
mechanism[s] upon which we depend for explanation” (Salmon, 1984, p. 276) and its
description would be part of a theory that unifies that variety of cases. In the next section,
I examine how TIB implements the mechanistic conception of explanation.

4. Mechanistic explanation in The Theory of Island Biogeography
2

See Wilson (1971, 2-3, 458-460); chapter 17 illustrates application of the method (Ibid.,
328-334); Wilson (2000 [1975], 27-31).
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TIB contains few references to mechanisms. However, based on the normative account of
mechanistic explanation by Craver (2007) and the work of Bechtel and Richardson
(1993) on the mechanistic experimental strategies, I show that MacArthur and Wilson
apply the mechanistic approach to explain the diversity of species on islands, and the
regular relationship between species’ numbers, i.e., their diversity and the area of island.

4.1. The explanandum phenomenon

MacArthur and Wilson’s first formulation of the explanandum of the theory of
biogeography is diversity of species on islands, which are understood broadly as any
isolated area.3 The problem is to explain why there is a certain number of species on an
island and why there are certain species rather than others on the island. The first
explanation of species diversity is formulated in terms of an equation:
(1) S=CAz,
where S is the number of species, A is the area, C is a parameter that varies with the taxon
and biogeographic region, and z is a constant. Thus, the number of species on an island
depends on area, C and z. The larger is the area of an island, the greater is the number of
species on that island.
MacArthur and Wilson do not see area as a determining factor and explanans of
the number of species on islands “because area seldom exerts a direct effect on a species’

3

That diversity of species is the explanatory focus of MacArthur and Wilson is
evidenced, for instance, by the claim “Our ultimate theory of species diversity…”
(MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, p. 8. Italics added for emphasis - V. P.).
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presence”, such that the theory of species diversity may not mention area (MacArthur and
Wilson, 1967, p. 8). Rather, “[m]ore often area allows a large enough sample of habitats,
which in turn control species occurrence” (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, p. 8). Equation
(1) is a how-possibly model, sensu Craver. It conjectures the mechanism of species
diversity in the form of a regular relationship between changes in numbers of species
given changes in area. The equation approximates the regularity, but is not sufficiently
explanatory. The regularity itself requires an explanation. Because of this, MacArthur and
Wilson change the explanandum from diversity of species on islands to orderly
relationship between island area and species diversity. That the latter is the explanandum
is evidenced by the very title of the third chapter of their book – Further Explanations of
the Area-Diversity Pattern (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, p. 19).
A central piece of the explanans of the orderly relationship between island area
and species diversity is a model of the underlying mechanism and it comes in two
versions. The first version of the model (Figure 1) accounts for species diversity as an
equilibrium between emigration and extinction.
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The immigration rate decreases because fewer immigrants belong to new species
as more species become established. If more species are present on the island, then more
are going to go extinct. Extinction balances out immigration and so the number of species
is at equilibrium. This model is a mechanism sketch of the actual mechanism. It describes
real processes, immigration and extinction, but it does not represent how size of island
and its distance from the mainland affect the equilibrium number of species. This
weakness of the immigration-based model prompts MacArthur and Wilson to propose a
more realistic model, depicted in Figure 2, that takes into account these factors.

Mechanistic Approach of The Theory of Island Biogeography

18

This second model is a mechanism schema, likewise in the sense of Craver. It is a
more complete description of the mechanism, since it encompasses size of island and its
distance to mainland in addition to immigration and extinction. Proximity to the source
region increases the immigration rate, while a decrease in the area of the island increases
the extinction rate. The various levels of the equilibrium number of species are due to
various combinations of different sizes of islands and their distances to the source region.
This model also represents more accurately the explanandum as various equilibria of
species numbers on islands of various sizes and situated at different distances from the
mainland. Based on this model, MacArthur and Wilson formulate several models to
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explore how changes in the modulating conditions, i.e., variations in island size and in
distance to the source region; presence of stepping stones; and islands forming
archipelagos affect species diversity on islands (1967, 27-32).
Table 1 (Figure 3) from the introductory chapter of TIB is another schema, and an
important one, as I will show, of the mechanism of species diversity on islands.4
Commentators of TIB have not discussed it.5

4

Values ‘small’ and ‘reduced’ of variables ‘size,’ ‘habitat variety’ and ‘equilibrial
number of species’ indicate that the table describes only the case of small islands. A table
for islands of other sizes would not contain new variables, but only different values. For
example, there would be ‘large’ size, ‘high’ habitat variety and ‘low’ extinction rate.
5
For example, Kingsland’s (1995) discussion of TIB focuses only on the first model,
Figure 1. Ishida (2007) and Odenbaugh (2011) consider only the equation form of the
equilibrium model (equation 1) and its developments. Sismondo (2000) refers to the first
two graphical models, Figures 1 and 2, as well as to equation 1.
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MacArthur and Wilson say about this table that it “shows the sequences of causation as
we conceive them and their location as topics in the next six chapters of the book” (1967,
p. 7). This table is not just a plan of the book. The reference to “the sequence of
causation” suggests that the table is a causal graph in the sense used in the literature on
causal modeling (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 2000) and on casual
explanation (Woodward, 2003). Causal graphs consist of nodes linked by directed edges,
and nodes represent variables. Upper case letters commonly designate nodes. Causal
relationship between X and Y, in which X causes Y, is represented by the following
causal graph: X  Y. Instead of upper case letters, the table uses verbal expressions to
designate causal factors, but the directed edges represent the causal relationships. Given
how the table is articulated and given MacArthur and Wilson’s explicit admission that the
table shows the sequence of causation, it follows that the table is a causal graph. And the
graph represents the causal structure of the mechanism responsible for the orderly
relationship between various levels of species diversity on islands and their area, and how
this structure, together with climatic variability, has an effect on evolution.
The equilibrium model (Figure 2) that has been the main focus of most
commentators of TIB refers to species numbers, island area, immigration, extinction, and
distance to the source region as factors determining species’ numbers at equilibrium. The
equilibrium model captures mathematical dependencies, which cannot be identified with
causal or explanatory dependency relations. The mathematical dependencies, by
themselves, are not explanatory. To be explanatory, a causal interpretation must
complement the model that captures mathematical dependencies (Craver, 2006, p. 365).
And it is the causal graph depicted in the table that expresses the causal interpretation. It
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specifies which variables represent causes and which stand for effects. In addition to all
the variables of the equilibrium model, the causal graph contains habitat variety and
barriers to dispersal, which comprise stepping-stones, distance to the source region and
whether islands are clumped. Compared to the equilibrium model, the causal graph
represents all the factors that MacArthur and Wilson see as responsible for species
diversity. As such, it is more realistic than the previous ones and is a more complete
description of components of the mechanism and of relationships between them.
Additionally, the causal graph indicates that the product of this mechanism, equilibrium
number of species and turnover rate is causally linked to r selection that together with
climatic variability and K selection ultimately affect evolution. The upshot is that to
describe a mechanism, it is necessary to use several models, each of which sheds light on
some aspect of the mechanism and together they offer a complete description. To
paraphrase Levins (1966), a complete description of the mechanism is at the intersection
of several models.

4.2. Constitutive aspect

A good mechanistic explanation identifies real components that satisfy four
criteria: (1) components have a stable cluster of properties, (2) are robust, (3) can be used
to intervene onto other parts and activities, and (4) are plausible in a given pragmatic
context (Craver, 2007, pp. 131-133). The causal graph indicates the components of “the
machinery” responsible for the species-area relationship. They are islands, source region
and populations of different species, and they satisfy these criteria.
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First of all, a caveat on source region: neither the equilibrium models nor the
causal graph represent it, and MacArthur and Wilson do not examine it in as much detail
as islands, yet one can infer from the role of the source region in accounting for the
equilibrium number of species on islands that it is a component. First, immigration to any
island originates from a source region. Without immigration from a source region, no
species diversity on any island is possible. Second, whether an island is far or near
relative to a source region affects immigration. The source region is, hence, a necessary
component for determining the rate of immigration and the number of species on islands.
Third, any island that immigration originates from functions as a source region. Since
islands are components of the “machinery”, the source region is a component as well.
All three aforementioned components have stable properties, and some of them
receive extensive attention in TIB. A stable property of islands is area, habitat variety
being another one. While the equilibrium model does not mention the latter, the causal
graph shows that changes in size change habitat variety. Traits of species receive ample
attention. MacArthur and Wilson examine in detail which properties of species are
relevant for successful colonization and immigration. At the population level, it is birth
and mortality rates, the intrinsic rate of population growth and efficient utilization of
resources. They do not leave the investigation of properties of populations at this general
level that is suitable for modeling. Instead, MacArthur and Wilson list the specific
attributes of species that make them good colonizers (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, pp.
80-83). For example, birds that are good colonizers and have high intrinsic population
growth rates tend to fly in small flocks, while birds that efficiently utilize resources are
able to occupy many habitats and tend to eat seeds. Plants that have fast individual
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development, large quantities of progeny and occasionally self-pollinate are good
colonizers and have high population growth. Some species prefer stable habitats, while
for others unstable habitats are necessary to flourish. These, as well as other properties of
organisms differently determine the immigration and extinction rates, and the
colonization process, under the same conditions. A similar attention to ecological details
of community structure on islands and to morphological and behavioral properties of
species helps explain the invasibility of islands (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, pp. 94104). This analysis of colonization and immigration in terms of the life history properties
of species, which are components of these processes, rather than simply measuring and
modeling these processes, indicates the mechanistic approach.
The robustness criterion requires that a variety of causally and theoretically
independent devices should be used to detect parts and to provide evidence for their
existence (Craver, 2007, p. 132). MacArthur and Wilson used causally and theoretically
independent sources of evidence to determine that island size indeed influences the level
at which species equilibrate. In particular, they used evidence from past recordings of
species diversity on islands of the West Indies, of the Dry Tortugas, and field
experiments on artificial islands (subsection 4.5 develops this aspect).
Consistent with the third criterion of real components, MacArthur and Wilson
modified size, distance and configuration of islands in the equilibrium model to explore
how such modifications affect the equilibrium number of species (MacArthur & Wilson,
1967, pp. 27-31). However, such interventions are not restricted to the domain of
modeling, but are possible and take place on real islands and can be used to intervene
onto other parts and activities. Environmental and anthropogenic factors routinely
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change, even if oftentimes at very slow pace, the size and habitat of various islands and
of source regions. Shortly after the publication of TIB, Wilson and Simberloff
(Simberloff & Wilson, 1969, 1970; Wilson & Simberloff, 1969) published results of a
field experiment intended to test the theory. They set the density of faunal populations to
zero by fumigating several islands (more on this experiment in subsection 4.5). Thus,
they manipulated density of faunal populations - which are parts - to change equilibrium
number of species, colonization and extinction rates, which are parts and activities
respectively.
The criterion of plausibility requires that “the parts’ existence should be
demonstrable under the conditions relevant to the given request for explanation of the
phenomenon” (Craver, 2007, p. 132). Given that “area seldom exerts a direct effect on a
species’ presence” (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, p. 8), it does not seem to be a plausible
ecological factor that by itself could have an explanatory role; hence, MacArthur and
Wilson’s shift from S=CAz to models based on the ecological processes of immigration
and extinction. Nevertheless, area is plausible as an indicator of an island’s diversity of
habitats and its ability to accommodate a certain number of species. Because of this, it is
maintained as a main property of islands.
MacArthur and Wilson talk about stepping-stones as if they were a separate type
of component. However, stepping-stones are just islands. Whether these islands function
as stepping-stones depends on their location between source region and another island,
and so they do not need to be treated as a separate type of component.
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4.3. Causal relations and activities

“Activities are the causal components in mechanisms”, and they can be used for
manipulation and control in the sense of Woodward’s (2003) conception of causation
(Craver, 2007, p. 6). Properly organized productive activities of components are
responsible, at least partly, for producing the explanandum phenomenon, so a
mechanistic explanation must describe them. Verbs and verb form (participles,
gerundives, etc.) offer a guide for identifying activities (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 4).
Consistent with this view, MacArthur and Wilson’s approach contains numerous
descriptions of activities of components. For example, considering the recolonization of
the Krakatau islands after a volcanic eruption destroyed the entire flora and fauna, they
note about certain birds that they “colonized three islands,” “appeared on the islands,”
while others have not “established as breeding populations,” or “disappeared.” Yet
another species was “brooding” (p. 47). The description of a good colonizer contains
references to a number of activities. For example, birds tend to “fly long distances,” they
“clump” and “occupy many habitats,” and tend to “eat seeds.” Plants “constantly colonize
newly opened habitats,” and it is indicated that they self-pollinate, and produce
propagules, while ants exhibit the trait— of unknown significance—of laying odor trails
(MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, p. 81). And all species must somehow traverse the space
between the source region and the destination island. Most importantly for the
explanatory role of activities is that the equilibrium models represent the processes of
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immigration and extinction, which, in their turn, indicate activities of migrating and
dying out. 6
Not all activities are easily visualized like the aforementioned, yet they are
productive of changes and can be used for manipulation and control in the sense of
Woodward’s (2003) conception of causation: if there is a possible intervention on X that
changes the value of Y or the probability distribution of Y, while all other variables are
held fixed, then X causes Y. Decreasing the distance between island and source region
reduces immigration and extinction, and increasing the distance declines immigration and
extinction rates. Changes in immigration and extinction change the equilibrium number
of species. Similarly, increasing area of an island increases immigration and extinction
and the equilibrium number of species. The causal graph (Figure 3) indicates causal
relations of this kind. For example, a small island size reduces habitat diversity, yet the
size of the island does not manifest any obvious activity, nor does the high extinction rate
that reduces equilibrial number of species. These productive activities establish
relationships that are causal in that they are exploitable for manipulation and control.7

4.4. Organization

Organization of components in a mechanism distinguishes them from aggregates, and the
mechanistic explanation wants to capture that organization (Bechtel and Richardson,
1993; Craver, 2007). Components form a mechanism provided that they do not make up

6

Italics added throughout for emphasis – V. P.
For a more detailed argument for linking activities and relationships exploitable for
manipulation and control based on a different ecological case see Pâslaru (2009).
7
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an aggregate, which Craver characterizes based on a definition by Wimsatt (1997):
assuming that a property or activity A of the whole S is explained by the properties or
activities P of its parts X1, X2, …, Xm, A property of S is an aggregate of P properties of
X’s when:
(W1) InterSubstitution: A is invariant under the rearrangement and
intersubstitution of Xs;
(W2) Size Scaling: A remains qualitatively similar (if quantitative, differing only
in value) with the addition or subtraction of Xs;
(W3) Decomposition and ReAggregation: A remains invariant under the
disaggregation and reaggregation of Xs; and
(W4) Linearity: There are no cooperative or inhibitory interactions between Xs
that are relevant to A (modified after Craver, 2007, p. 135, and Wimsatt, 1997, p. S376).
The mechanism of the species-area relationship does not satisfy any of these
conditions. Plants are early colonizers and herbivores are late colonizers, and species
migrate to islands from source region, and they cannot be intersubstituted or rearranged,
contrary to (W1). This is because plants create the conditions for herbivores to get
established, and source region contains the pool of species, but not vice versa. The
mechanism does not remain qualitatively similar with the addition or subtraction of parts.
Subtraction of either the source region, or island, or populations disrupts the functioning
of the system. Source region is required for species to originate from, and islands are
necessary for species to migrate to. Hence, condition (W2) for aggregativity is not met. It
is not possibly to take the mechanism apart and then put it back together, as required by
(W3), without disrupting their collective ability to produce the orderly relationship
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between species’ numbers and area. Separating some components, islands or source
region, destroys the system. The effect of separating populations of species depends on
whether their role in the island community can be compensated. If the role of a species
cannot be substituted, its removal disrupts the functioning of the mechanism and
reaggregation is problematic. As for condition (W4), it is not satisfied because of the
cooperative and inhibitory interactions between components, especially between
populations. Seeds need birds to colonize islands, and herbivores need plants to survive.
Established species predate on or compete with newly arriving species, or with the
established ones, which leads to extinction or inhibition of population growth.
The mechanism of species diversity is spatially and temporally organized. Size of
islands, their location relative to source region, and whether stepping-stones connect
islands and the source region are important for constituting the mechanism. Islands that
are too small for species, say, insects, birds, or plants, to populate them and islands that
are located at a distance that exceeds their ability to reach them will not receive
immigration; hence, there will be no species diversity on these islands. Stepping-stones
connecting islands increase immigration rate, but if stepping-stones are numerous and
organized in a manner that creates a corridor between the island and the source region,
the species dynamics on that island will be assimilated to that on the mainland. The order
and rates of immigration and extinction determine the relationship between species’
numbers and area. Succession following a major environmental event, say, a volcanic
eruption that wipes out the flora and fauna, has a specific order. Pioneer plants colonize
the barren island first. Plants of secondary succession and then trees follow them
(MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, p. 50). Trees cannot colonize an island before pioneer
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plants. If the rate of immigration is too low, species’ numbers on islands will be below
the expected equilibrium point. A similar outcome would occur if rates of extinction were
too high, say, because tsunamis often strike the island.

4.5. Constitutive Relevance

Bechtel and Richardson (1993) and, following them, Craver (2007) argue that two types
of experimental interventions are required to identify the relevant functions and
components in a system. The analytic, or bottom-up interventions inhibit or stimulate the
functioning of a component. Alternatively, one could also increase or decrease the
quantity of that component. If the component intervened upon is important for the
functioning of the system, the intervention will change the behavior of the system. The
top-down experiments, or synthetic strategy, make the system perform a function and one
examines which component parts become active. Additionally, one could create a model
system based on a hypothesis regarding the components, their operations and
organization that are required for its functioning and then compare the behavior of the
model system with that of the real one. If both bottom-up and top-down experimental
interventions yield convergent results, the component subject to intervention is a relevant
one for the system to produce the phenomenon under scrutiny.
To support their explanation of the species-area relationship, MacArthur and
Wilson use evidence that presupposes both the analytical and synthetic experimental
strategies. Examining the second equilibrium model (Figure 2), they suggest a number of
interventions on islands. Increasing the degree of isolation between the island and the
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source region reduces immigration. Intervening to decrease the area of the island
increases extinction rate (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, pp. 22-23). They also examine
four cases of species distribution that vary due to changes in island area, distance
between islands and source region, and configuration of islands (MacArthur & Wilson,
1967, pp. 27-32). Each of the models of those cases presupposes the use of inhibitory and
excitatory techniques of the bottom-up experiments. In what would amount to a thought
experiment executed by modifying the variables of models, MacArthur and Wilson
intervene and increase the distance between archipelagos and their source region
(MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, p. 28, figure 12), or between some islands and the source
region (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, p. 31, figure 15). These modifications are analogous
to excitatory interventions, for they increase the entity that separates islands from the
source region. Size of stepping-stones (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, p. 29, figure 13) and
distances between islands forming an archipelago (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, p. 31,
figure 15) are also manipulated.
MacArthur and Wilson use observational data from various replicates, i.e.,
islands, in a manner that illustrates another way of applying the excitatory technique in
thought experiments. Comparing data on densities of species on several islands of the
Dry Tortugas of roughly the same area, they found out that an increase in species’
numbers on islands of roughly the same area increases the extinction rate (MacArthur and
Wilson, 1967, pp. 51-55). Using replicates of these islands amounts to an experiment in
which density of species is increased to various levels to elicit its effect on extinction
rate, while the area remains unchanged.
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MacArthur and Wilson also employ evidence from experiments performed by
other ecologists. These experiments can be seen as top-down experiments, or as
applications of the synthetic strategy. In particular, the design of these experiments
assumes a hypothesis about the process of island colonization, formulates a model of how
the system that underlies this process functions and then tests the model against the
behavior of actual systems, just as Bechtel and Richardson (1993) and Craver (2007)
describe the synthetic strategy. Put differently, the system is set to operate and the
experimenter examines which components are activated. One such experiment was
performed by Bassett Maguire, Jr. who simulated islands by using bottles of fresh water
placed at various distances from a fresh water pond and at various heights above the
ground. In agreement with the equilibrium model, the colonization curve drops as
distance from the source region increases. The design of this experiment assumes the
hypothesis that distance from the source region is a determinant of species’ numbers on
islands (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, pp. 42-43). Another experiment to which
MacArthur and Wilson refer is due to Ruth Patrick. She suspended small glass slides of
two sizes in the water of a spring and then counted and identified the attached diatoms
after every two weeks. The design of this experiment assumes the hypothesis that islands
of larger areas accommodate a greater number of species. The data shows indeed that
“islands” of large area hold more species than small ones, and that the competition that
begins once the diatoms become crowded reduces the number of species (MacArthur and
Wilson, 1967, pp. 55-57).
MacArthur and Wilson did not perform experiments using the analytic and
synthetic strategies to test their theory, but Simberloff and Wilson did. To test certain
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aspects of the theory of island biogeography, they fumigated six small mangrove islands
in the Florida Keys to defaunate them and then monitored for two years how faunal
species recolonize the islands. The islands were ultimately recolonized and the faunal
species reached a dynamic equilibrium as expected in light of the theory of island
biogeography (Simberloff & Wilson, 1969, 1970; Wilson & Simberloff, 1969). To the
extent that the experiment decreases to zero the amount of one component – faunal
species – it implements the analytic inhibitory strategy. In the absence of faunal species,
no equilibrium of such species can occur, which shows that faunal species are a relevant
component of the “machinery.” However, the significance of this experiment is better
assessed if it is seen as implementing the synthetic strategy. Islands are model systems
aimed to test hypotheses about equilibrium of species, colonization processes, and the
role of island area and distance from the source region in influencing these processes.
Considered from this point of view, defaunation initiates colonization and the
experimenter examines the process of colonization, the number of species at which
immigration and extinction equilibrate, and the role of island area and distance from the
source region in affecting these processes.

5. The Message of The Theory of Island Biogeography beyond 1967

Having significantly contributed to the initiation of a paradigm of ecology in general and
of island biogeography in particular, TIB is a canonical example to identify the norms of
scientific explanation in ecology and to examine how the focus on mechanisms can help
solve other debates in ecology. I outline first an account of the norms of ecological
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explanation based on the analysis from section 4, and then I show how the notion of
mechanism could resolve a debate from ecology. I also show that even if the equilibrium
paradigm of TIB were to be changed, the norms of mechanistic explanation in ecology
will be used to account for ecological phenomena within the next paradigm of insular
biogeography.

5.1. An account of explanation in ecology

It can be learned from TIB that to explain in ecology is to describe the mechanism of a
phenomenon under scrutiny and that this description can extend over several levels and
comprise several models that represent various aspects of the mechanism. The
explanandum phenomenon has multiple aspects and the mechanistic explanation must
account for all of them. Ecological phenomena are produced under conditions that
modulate, precipitate, or perturb their production, or they could occur in non-standard
conditions. Description of the putative mechanism must show how it produces the
explanandum phenomenon in all these conditions. Changes in the size of islands, their
distance to the source region and their organization in archipelagos modulate the areadiversity relationship. Predation modulates competition, and changes in temperature and
moisture modulate colonization. A very small size of islands perturbs the area-diversity
pattern, but so do disease and parasitism that perturb population growth. Cataclysms,
such as volcanic eruptions, precipitate the formation of the area-diversity pattern, and the
introduction of lynxes in a hare habitat precipitates the formation of predator-prey
oscillations. The same mechanism accounts for the area-diversity relationship obtained in
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experimental conditions, which are not standard, as well as in natural conditions.
Likewise, the same mechanism of competition accounts for competitive exclusion
obtained in Gause’s bottles and in natural conditions. Craver (2007, p. 126) thinks that
knowing the inhibiting conditions is part of a complete characterization of the
phenomenon. Although MacArthur and Wilson do not examine conditions that inhibit
production of the phenomenon, the requirement to describe them could also be part of the
normative account of ecological explanation.
Since mechanisms consist of entities and activities organized such that they
produce the phenomenon under scrutiny (Craver, 2007, p. 6), mechanistic explanations in
ecology must describe each of these elements. Entities are the parts of the mechanism,
and they are expected to have stable properties, to be robust, to be ecologically plausible,
and they could be used to intervene upon other entities and activities. Activities are what
the entities do in the mechanism. This requires ecologists to describe the relevant
behaviors of species and of inanimate components. Depending on the explanandum
phenomenon, the relevant behavior could be feeding, mating, colonization, competitive
interaction, etc. Activities of inanimate components could be ferrying insects to islands,
dispersing seeds, providing shelter and habitat, or preventing dispersion, setting the stage
for succession by wiping out flora and fauna, eliminating predators, or breaking seed
dormancy. Both components and activities are organized actively, spatially and
temporally, and mechanistic explanation has to specify that clearly. The dominant type of
organization varies with the specific mechanism. Some mechanisms of interspecific
competition for a limited food resource could be spatially organized, with organisms of
different species feeding on the same food at different heights of a tree. In other cases,
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temporal organization plays the key role, as it happens with competing organisms that
feed on the same resource at different times.
Mechanistic explanations in ecology are multilevel. They integrate information
from several levels of reality because mechanisms producing ecological phenomena are
multilevel. Components of mechanisms could come from various strata of the traditional
hierarchy of levels that extends from molecules and cells, to organisms, populations,
communities and all the way up to the biosphere, and include inanimate objects of
various sizes, or even processes. A mechanism, such as the mechanism responsible for
the colonization success of invasive species, could consist of entities from different strata
of the traditional hierarchy: allelochemicals, populations, communities and soil. Since
any mechanism is a mechanism of a phenomenon (Glennan, 2002), what entities make up
a mechanism depends on the phenomenon being investigated (Craver, 2007). If the
problem under scrutiny requires it, every mechanism component can be further examined
to study its constituents. That is possible because components of the lower levels consist
of components organized at even lower levels, which means that a mechanism can be
composed of other lower level mechanisms. Scrutiny of the competitive success of
invasive species can lead to examining the physiological mechanism producing
allelochemicals, their molecular composition, and their growth-suppressing effect on
other species. Similarly for processes, that can be seen as parts of mechanisms.
Colonization and extinction are processes consisting of numerous and various lower-level
components. Dispersions by wind, by debris, or by flight are lower-level components of
colonization. Deaths due to interspecific competition, predation, or parasitism are lowerlevel components of extinction. One can further look at, say, dispersion by flight and
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examine the properties of lower level entities and activities, and their organization. Thus,
one would examine how the anatomy and physiology of birds, or insects enables them to
cover the distances between islands, and whether air currents aid them. At what lower
level should mechanistic explanation stop? This question cannot be answered based on a
hierarchy of levels that is independent of the explanandum phenomenon, but rather on a
case-by-case basis and depending on the explanatory relevance of the lower level
component (Craver, 2007, p. 191).
Mechanistic explanations must incorporate descriptions of the causal relationships
between components of the ecological mechanism. These relationships should be
understood along manipulationist lines. A component X causes Y provided that changes
in X bring about changes in Y, while all other paths from X to Y are blocked. Whenever
possible, the specific activity of components should be specified. X might cause Y in
virtue of the fact that X is in a symbiotic relationship with Y and facilitates Y’s
acquisition of nutrients, or X might live as an ectoparasite on Y and deprive it of some of
its energy. Causal interpretations in terms of activities and relationships that can be
subject to manipulations should accompany phenomenological accounts of associations
between species.
Good mechanistic explanations are expected to describe all of the relevant
components and interactions between them, and none of the irrelevant ones (Craver,
2007, p. 140). Relevant components are at the intersection of analytic and synthetic
experimental strategies. Experiments in ecology are traditionally categorized into
laboratory experiments, field experiments, and natural experiments. Each of them has
strengths and weaknesses, and ecologists combine evidence from all three types of
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experiments, or only two, usually field and laboratory experiments (Diamond, 1986). The
requirement of constitutive relevance calls for a combination of these types of
experiments so as to implement the mutual manipulability of component parts as a way of
identifying the relevant components. This means that lab or field experiments that are
designed on the analytic strategy are insufficient for ruling out irrelevant factors. Lab or
field experiments based on the synthetic strategy must complement the former.
The kind of mechanisms that ecology and biogeography should be after according
to MacArthur and Wilson are complex-systems mechanisms, as Glennan (2002, 2010)
calls them. Complex-systems mechanisms are multiply realizable. They are reliable
mechanisms and their repeated functioning produces regularities, which are described by
generalizations, some of which are thought of as laws. The mechanism of the areadiversity pattern articulated by MacArthur and Wilson is such a reliable mechanism. Its
reliable operation produces the species-area regularity that Schoener (1976)8 and Lange
(2005) describe as a law of ecology. An important consequence of the reliability of
complex-mechanisms is that their behavior is predictable, and, consequently, one can
formulate predictions of specific values and test hypotheses. By describing complexsystems mechanisms, ecology and biogeography become predictive sciences. This aspect
connects the goal of describing mechanisms with the hypothetico-deductive method that
both MacArthur and Wilson endorsed. If the description of the complex-systems
mechanism is accurate, hypotheses derived from its model will not be invalidated by
data. Hypotheses derived from inaccurate descriptions of mechanisms will be falsified.

8

Apud Lomolino, et al. (2010, p. 513).
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Not all ecological phenomena are repeatable. Some of them are singular and of
interest to ecologists. They are produced by ephemeral-mechanisms, as Glennan (2002,
2010) describes them. Ephemeral-mechanisms are not multiply-realizable. They are
contingent, singular sequences of events that lead to a singular occurrence, such as the
continental drift, the escape of the European gypsy moth caterpillars from Trouvelot’s
house in 1868 and the onset of the defaunation of hardwood forests in the Northeast of
United States, and the introduction of Zebra mussel around 1985 to the Great Lakes. The
norms of mechanistic explanation apply to ephemeral-mechanisms, as well. A good
description of ephemeral-mechanisms specifies their components, their spatial or
temporal organization, and the way they interact. Since ephemeral-mechanisms produce
singular phenomena, whose occurrence is typically independent of ecologists, synthetic
experimental strategies take precedence over analytical ones in guiding the identification
of relevant components and of causal relationships between them. To study singular
phenomena, ecologists have to simulate singular phenomena in laboratory or field
experiments, which requires use of synthetic strategy. Employment of analytic strategies
is confined to causal modeling that allows manipulation of values of variables that
represent components and their spatial or temporal organization.

5.2. A debate on the nature of ecology

I showed in section 3 that MacArthur and Wilson saw explanation, as opposed to
naturalists’ detailed descriptions, related to the issue of establishing biogeography, i.e.,
ecology of geographic distributions of species as a science. Ecology becomes science
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once it explains patterns in nature. MacArthur and Wilson’s use of the mechanistic
approach to explain the area-diversity pattern implies a conception of science centered on
describing mechanisms responsible for classes of similar phenomena. This view of
science and the associated norms of explanation can help resolve a recent debate on the
nature of ecology and its explanatory tools. The opposition between a conception of
ecology that is content with documenting the complexities of nature, as MacArthur
characterized it, and a conception that asks ecologists to explain repeated patterns has
continued in the form of a tension between views conceiving of ecology as an historical
science, and those that would like to see it formulate and use laws similarly to physics,
and those that opt for description of mechanisms.
Lev Ginzburg and Mark Colyvan (Mark Colyvan & Ginzburg, 2003a, 2003b; M.
Colyvan & Ginzburg, 2010; Ginzburg & Colyvan, 2004) argue for a nomothetic research
program for ecology. They think that exponential growth of populations, usually known
as Malthus’ law, is the first law of ecology and it is analogous to the first law of Newton
in describing a default state from which actual populations deviate. And the deviation
must be accounted for in terms of mechanisms. Marcel Weber (1999) offers a similar
argument and account of the explanatory role of laws, but he thinks that the principle of
competitive exclusion is the first law of ecology. Several ecologists (Berryman, 1999,
2003; Murray, 2000; Turchin, 2001) also argue in favor of laws of ecology, but they do
not shed light on their explanatory role, but mostly look at the predictive role of laws.
According to the opposite view, biology, including the discipline of ecology, is an
historical science and cannot have laws like physics because its systems are far-from
equilibrium, nonreversible and require historical explanations (Quenette & Gerard, 1993).
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Ecology should be conceived of as a science of case studies, centered on revealing the
causal nexus underlying a phenomenon, instead of laws (Shrader-Frechette, 2003;
Shrader-Frechette & McCoy, 1993). Ecology does not have laws like those of Newton
that state how the universe works; it has only generalizations about observed regularities
and that can be used to formulate models that describe the systems under scrutiny
(O'Hara, 2005). Both its epistemology and its methodology make ecology an historical
science (Brown, 2011). The other alternative that appears to be embraced by many
ecologists, as suggested by their work and by formulations of research agendas for
ecology (Simberloff, 2004; Sutherland, et al., 2013), is to describe mechanisms that
underlie regularities (Lawton, 1999) and that are responsible for a group of phenomena
(Tilman, 1987).
The idea of mechanism and the norms of mechanistic explanation implicit in TIB
could solve the dispute between the aforementioned views and provide a basis for
methodological unification of ecology. In light of the foregoing account of explanation in
ecology, I suggest that the basis of ecological explanations is mechanistic, but the
specific mechanisms and phenomena under scrutiny are different, which makes the
ecological enterprises appear different. When the focus of ecologists is on singular
phenomena produced by ephemeral ecological mechanisms, they appear as formulating
historical explanations. When ecologists turn their attention to complex-mechanisms of
varying degrees of reliability and which, consequently, produce phenomena of various
degrees of regularity, they are doing what most ecologists do: identifying mechanisms
responsible for various groups of phenomena. However, when ecologists look for
regularities across various domains of less restricted scope, they embark on a research

Mechanistic Approach of The Theory of Island Biogeography

41

program that appears nomothetic. However, even if such regularities are identified, their
use in explanations cannot dispense of mechanism descriptions, as the work of Ginzburg
and Colyvan, and Weber shows. Malthus’ law and the principle of competitive exclusion
describe default states that do not occur. To explain why observed populations deviate
from the expected default conditions, one has to identify relevant mechanisms. Moreover,
some ecologists explicitly claim that identification of regularities, such as allometries, is
the first step toward revealing the underlying mechanisms. Explaining how the lowerlevel mechanisms are responsible for upper-level regularities is the goal of ecology
(Brown, Gillooly, Allen, Savage, & West, 2004).

5.3 The new paradigm of insular biogeography and the old norms of explanation

TIB has not been able to account for all the patterns of insular biogeography. The
accumulated problems have prompted projects to change the equilibrium paradigm. The
new proposals call for amending the equilibrium principle of the theory to accommodate
processes that are not at equilibrium or are nonequilibrium, as well as for
acknowledgment of the importance of diverse features of species, islands and landscapes
or seascapes in influencing immigration and extinction, and of in situ speciation and
species interactions (Lomolino, 2000; Lomolino & Brown, 2009). Yet the new paradigm
of island biogeography appears to require the mechanistic approach. Lomolino and
Brown suggest that the new theory of island biogeography should be multi-scale, speciesand process-based, and include system feedback (2009, p. 385). In terms of the
mechanistic approach, for the theory to be multi-scale, it means that it should draw on
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information from multiple levels of mechanism, and which are not merely levels of size,
or composition. The components cited in explanations could be of different sizes, and
situated at different levels of the conventional hierarchy of levels of organization from
cells to the biosphere. What components and from which levels should be cited depends
on the problem being investigated. That the theory must be species- and process-based
means that it must take into consideration the properties of species and islands that affect
the basal processes of immigration, extinction, and evolution (Lomolino & Brown, 2009,
p. 385). Such a focus on properties of components and examining how changes in the
properties affect the behavior that the components produce is a core requirement of
mechanistic explanation and it derives from the definition of mechanisms. System
feedback can take the form of interspecific interaction, evolutionary divergence and
speciation, all of which can affect the basal processes and the capacities of species
(Lomolino & Brown, 2009, p. 385). On the mechanistic view, no examination of
components would be complete without considering how they interact, what they do, or
what happens to them. The requirement to take into account how interspecific interaction,
divergence of populations over time and speciation influence insular biotas fits the
mechanistic normative account. Thus, the new paradigm of island biogeography appears
to be committed to the old mechanistic approach to explanation.

6. Conclusion
The foregoing examination has shown that TIB is a book that was instrumental in
initiating a paradigm in ecology. Based on other works of MacArthur and Wilson, I
argued that they assumed a mechanistic philosophy of science. In light of that, and given
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two more recent accounts of mechanistic explanation, I showed in detail that TIB
implements a mechanistic approach to explanation. Since TIB is a paradigmatic work of
ecology, I used the analysis of its mechanistic approach to formulate a normative account
of mechanistic explanation in ecology. Furthermore, I showed that a mechanistic
perspective solves a dispute on the nature of ecology and that the new paradigm of
insular biogegraphy assumes the mechanistic norms of explanation implicit in TIB.
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